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Michael Fakhri* 
In EC—Seal Products1, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body (AB) held that the European 
Union (EU) Seal Regime2 banning the importation of  seal products could be justified under General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX(a)3 as a measure necessary to protect public morals. It also held that 
the indigenous communities (IC) exception under the EU Seal Regime is inconsistent with GATT Article I:1 
(Most-Favored Nation) because it discriminated against commercial fishers in Canada and Norway and was 
applied in a manner that favored the mostly Inuit seal hunters of  Greenland, and thus ran afoul of  Article XX’s 
chapeau. Since the entire EU Seal Regime is not likely to be done away with, the most important question for 
Inuit communities is: how will the EU change the discriminatory aspects of  the Seal Regime and IC exception? 
The EU faces an October deadline to pass its new legislation and this remains a very live issue.4 
After the AB decision, animal rights activists of  a certain ilk, such as People for the Ethical Treatment of  
Animals (PETA), claimed victory.5 It seems that the protection of  animal welfare as a public moral is now a 
legitimate reason to restrict trade. 
In Canada, many Inuit leaders were angry.6 One reason was because the ban was upheld on moral terms—
implying a judgment against an important means by which Inuit communities eat and trade. Another criticism 
was that despite claims of  some consultation by the EU, the IC exception was not really designed by or in 
negotiation with Inuit.7 A related problem was that the exception was useless because it was never operational-
ized and applied to the Canadian Inuit. Some8 argue that the Seal Regime and IC exception violated Inuit 
peoples’ human rights.9 Terry Audla, President of  Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami10 stated after the AB decision, “[O]ur 
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position from the start has been a rejection of  the seal ban regulation as a whole, including all that is contained 
in it, including the Inuit exemption.”11 
Seeing the case in strictly adversarial terms—like Canada and Norway v. EU or Animal rights activists v. Inuit 
peoples12—fails to capture the full range of  issues at play in this case. Nor is this case solely a matter of  trying 
to balance economic interests, public morals, and animal welfare.13 One clue that there is more at stake arises 
from how the EU argued before the AB. In this case, the focus of  the EU Seal Regime was strictly in terms of  
seal suffering (seal conservation was not in question). Regardless, the EU put most of  its energy towards fram-
ing its GATT general exception arguments regarding seal welfare in terms of  public morals (Art. XX(a)) and 
spent little effort framing things in terms of  actual seal health (Art. XX(b)). Since public morals encompass a 
wide range of  policy matters, this suggests that the EU acted upon the issue more in terms of  exercising its 
political authority and ensuring it maintained its ability to address citizens’ demands and not animal rights. 
With a focus on Canada, I suggest that the dispute is about more than just the trade in seal products. This 
case brings into stark relief  questions of  self-determination of  Arctic indigenous peoples and multi-jurisdic-
tional sovereignty over the Arctic. I also propose how Inuit leaders may interpret this decision as a legal victory 
that grants them more political leverage in future negotiations. Despite the initial setbacks, this approach may 
allow them to have more control over the long-term socioeconomic repercussions of  this case. 
What Is at Stake? 
In Canada, the seal-hunt industry provided part-time employment for up to six thousand people, mostly in 
rural Atlantic Canada.14 The annual value of  the hunt was about thirty-five to forty million Canadian dollar 
(CAD) and could represent about 25-35 percent of  sealers’ total annual income. Before the EU ban, Inuit 
incomes from seal pelts could reach up to one million CAD annually.  
Only approximately 5 percent of  seal hunts in Canada (and Norway) would fall under the IC exception.15 Up 
until now, Canada has been representing the interests of  indigenous and non-indigenous seal hunters as a single 
group; it argued before the AB that there should not be a distinction between different seal hunters. 
Canada and Norway argued before the AB that the IC exception has unfairly granted Greenlandic hunters, 
who are almost entirely indigenous Inuit, a substantial increase in market share in the EU. In Greenland, virtu-
ally all hunts fall under the IC exception.16  
The IC exception on its own did not provide Canadian Inuit peoples much actual benefit because the wording 
of  the legislation lacked clarity and proper implementation procedures. All it did was empower the European 
Commission to “define the conditions for the placing on the market of  seal products which result from hunts 
traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities and contribute to their subsistence.” It is 
therefore not surprising that Greenland, with its predominantly Inuit population and its constitutional ties with 
Denmark, an EU member state, was proactive when the Seal Regime was enacted and negotiated with the EU 
 
11 Inuit Tapiriit Katanami, supra note 7.  
12 Terry Audla, The Only People Making Money Off  the Seal Hunt Are Anti-Sealing Campaigners, HUFFINGTON POST CANADA BLOG (Apr. 
28, 2014). 
13 Robert Howse et al., Sealing the Deal: The WTO’s Appellate Body Report in EC—Seal Products, 18 ASIL INSIGHTS Issue 12 (June 04, 
2014).  
14 Government of  Canada, Seals.  
15 Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of  Seal Products, 
WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (Adopted June 18, 2014), para. 7.597 [hereinafter Panel Report, EC—Seal Products]. 
16 Id.  
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to establish a system that implemented the IC exception.17 Canada instead focused its efforts on challenging 
the EU Seal Regime as a whole and did nothing to work with the EU to implement the IC exception. 
Since the AB decision upholds the Seal Regime but forces the EU to make its IC exception WTO compliant, 
the Government of  Canada and the EU, as declared in a Joint Statement, are now working out the details of  
how to make the IC exception actually benefit indigenous communities in Canada.18 The Government of  Nu-
navut and some Inuit leaders welcomed this initiative.19 Similarly, after the AB decision, the Premiers of  
Nunavut and Greenland have also issued a Joint Statement and expressed a commitment to coordinate efforts 
and work through the EU seal ban in order to improve the lives of  Inuit peoples.20  
The EU’s wording, interpretation, and implementation of  the new IC exception will determine whether it 
will benefit indigenous communities. The now-old EU Seal Regime only provided an exception for indigenous 
seal hunts on three conditions: that the hunt contributes to the subsistence of  the community, that the hunt is 
part of  the community’s tradition, and that the products are at least partly used and consumed in a traditional 
way.  
If  this type of  wording remains, the scale of  indigenous seal hunting, trading, and economic development 
will be determined by how the terms—subsistence and tradition—are understood and defined. Within this 
framework, future debates will be over what counts as or exceeds “subsistence.”21 Ecuador probably anticipated 
this point when it made its oral statement before the AB and supported the Panel's definition of  subsistence 
to include income-generating activities necessary to support traditional forms of  life for indigenous communi-
ties. This implied that commerce is a central component of  indigenous hunts, and not a secondary result of  
trading what is left over after local use. The other danger is that indigenous traditions may be interpreted by 
the EU as a static, anthropological practice (or even worse as a caricature) rather than as a dynamic, modern 
relationship between past and present.  
Regardless of  the new wording, the fundamental problem that remains in EU-indigenous relations is that 
the WTO legitimized the EU, instead of  indigenous communities themselves, as the body that gets to define 
what constitutes legitimate hunting. 
While the socioeconomic benefits remain unclear, this decision may be a political victory for indigenous 
communities in broader international legal terms. Canada (and Norway) used various techniques during the 
dispute to argue against privileging the category of  “indigenous.” For the Government of  Canada, this was 
partially an effort to protect the economic interests of  the nonindigenous rural communities in Atlantic Canada 
that that make up 95 percent of  Canadian seal hunts. It was also part of  the Government of  Canada’s long-
standing campaign to resist recognizing explicit indigenous rights in international law. 
 
17 European Commission, Commission Decision recognising the Greenland Department of  Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture 
(APNN) for the purposes of  Article 6 of  Commission Regulation (EU) No 737/2010 of  10 August 2010 laying down detailed rules 
for the implementation of  Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on trade in seal products, 
Apr. 25, 2013, C(2013) 2277 final. 
18 European Commission, Annex, Joint Statement by Canada and the European Union on Access to the European Union of  Seal 
Products from Indigenous Communities of  Canada to the Commission Decision on the Joint Statement by Canada and the European 
Union on Access to the European Union of  Seal Products from Indigenous Communities of  Canada, Aug. 18, 2014, C(2014) 5881 final 
Annex 1.  
19 Government of  Canada, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development of  Canada, News release, Canada Pursues Expanded Access and 
Opportunities in European Markets for Indigenous Sealers (Oct. 10, 2014,).  
20 Joint Statement of  Aleqa Hammond, Premier of  Greenland, and Peter Taptuna, Premier of  Nunavut Nuuk (July 2, 2014). 
21 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 1, at para. 5.324. 
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Who Is Indigenous in International Law? 
With a long history of  oppression and displacement, the stakes are high for indigenous communities de-
manding international legal recognition. International law avoids providing too precise a definition of  who 
constitutes indigenous peoples.22 “Indigenous peoples” is a category that is both dependent on history but ever 
changing in the present. The concept is part of  a continuous process of  lived experiences. It is defined through 
a particular social and institutional context, and by the process of  certain claims and conflicts. As such, there 
are a plethora of  legal instruments that define indigenous peoples in varying degrees of  specificity and in 
multiple ways.23 As an international legal concept, it has the power to mobilize marginalized groups; any strict 
definition will inevitably be controversial for being overinconclusive to some and underinclusive to others.  
The UN Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples passed by the General Assembly in 2007 was a 
significant moment for advancing the legal power that indigenous communities may wield.24 The UN Declara-
tion was adopted on September 13, 2007, when 143 countries voted in favor. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and the United States—which are all settler colonies with varying degrees of  tense indigenous relations—voted 
against. Since the original vote, these four countries have moved to endorse the Declaration but still argue that 
it is not legally binding. 
The UN Declaration played an important role in the EU Seal Ban dispute. The IC exception itself  explicitly 
relies on the UN Declaration (Recital 14 of  the Basic Regulation), and, during the dispute, the EU also refer-
enced the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention25. Canada argued before the AB that the Panel 
committed a legal error “by relying on international instruments extraneous to the case” and that these instru-
ments do not require the EU to protect the rights and interests of  indigenous communities.26  
The Panel was careful in framing the non-WTO instruments as matters of  fact of  which the EU relied on 
as its own legal obligations and not as obligations to all WTO Members.27 Nonetheless, the Panel took note 
and to some degree relied upon an expert report that referenced several international legal instruments (the 
UN Declaration, the ILO Convention, and the Charter of  the Inuit Circumpolar Council) to frame hunters’ 
status as belonging to an Inuit or indigenous community as one based on self-determination.  
The AB stepped around the perennial debate regarding what non-WTO sources may be brought into a WTO 
dispute and did not address it in its decision. But, it recognized the legitimacy of  the IC exception of  the EU 
Seal Regime. In a sense, the WTO affirms indigenous communities as an international legal concept, and puts 
into effect the EU expression of  its international legal obligations in the context of  international indigenous 
rights and seal hunting in the Arctic. For indigenous leaders, this may strengthen their position to argue that 
when Canada and the EU operationalize the IC exception, they are implicitly recognizing the binding nature of  
the UN Declaration (even as Canada denies such force).  
What remains to be seen is how this decision will affect seal hunting in other parts of  the world. It may also 
resonate across indigenous hunting rights in more global contexts. For better or for worse, this case is a re-
minder that indigenous communities in the Arctic need to continue to find ways to actively engage with, 
respond to, or resist the WTO lest they are treated as mere objects of  other actors’ interests and policies. At 
 
22 Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, in THE CONCEPT OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN ASIA 103 (Christian Erni ed., 2008). 
23 Christopher C. Dykes, UPDATE: Research Guide on Indigenous Peoples in International Law (July/Aug. 2012). 
24 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007). 
25 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No. 169), June 27 1989, 28 ILM 1382 
(1989). 
26 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 1, at para. 2.4. 
27 Panel Report, EC—Seal Products, supra note 14, at para. 7.295. 
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worst, WTO law will impose conditions to their detriment. At best, WTO law may be part of  the international 
legal repertoire that indigenous communities should consider, along with international human rights law, when 
determining how to deploy legal instruments to best serve their aspirations and interests.  
Self-determination and Sovereignty 
One of  the UN Declaration’s main purposes and effects is reaffirming the indigenous right to self-determi-
nation. But self-determination is a notoriously tricky concept. Historically, former colonial subjects have 
debated amongst themselves over how to configure self-determination in relation to sovereignty as a tactical 
question.28 One way to understand self-determination is as the power to constitute a community as a political 
and legal actor. It is also the power to express one’s interests through existing institutions. Sovereignty is more 
about control over territory, and everything and everyone within the territory. It is also the power to create rules 
and institutions. 
Self-determination may be aligned with the concept of  sovereignty by establishing a sovereign state. Or, self-
determination is expressed within a sovereign state by carving out zones of  varying degrees of  autonomy – 
through mechanisms such as indigenous rights, indigenous “reservations,” or sub-federal governments. Some-
times self-determination is expressed across several sovereign borders. This arises when an indigenous group 
represents the interests of  its members who live in different states. Self-determination can also be deployed 
against a sovereign power.29 Add to the mix the politics of  different groups competing over who rightfully 
speaks for a people.30 The UN Declaration is very careful in preserving existing state sovereignty and ensuring 
that the instrument cannot be used “as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of  sovereign and independent States” (Art. 
46). 
As evidenced in the list of  international legal instruments expressing indigenous rights,31 self-determination 
is enacted through a variety of  institutional authorities. By implicitly recognizing indigenous rights, the AB 
Report not only reflects and strengthens indigenous rights in international law in general, but it also highlights 
how the WTO is one institution through which indigenous self-determination is constituted through existing 
sovereign boundaries. In the future, international trade law and domestic commercial law will likely continue to 
be fields through which people will argue over indigenous rights. 
It remains to be seen whether the new IC exception will make seal hunting more lucrative for Inuit in Canada. 
Part of  the Inuit frustration is how Canada and the EU have until now excluded them from most processes of  
meaningful decision-making.32 What is clear, however, is that once the new exception is implemented and made 
WTO compliant, Inuit hunters will be the only ones allowed to export to the EU. A significant part of  self-
determination is a people’s right to freely choose their own political and economic systems, and their own way 
of  life. Inuit communities claim seal hunting as a central aspect of  their life; this exclusive market access re-
ingrains the importance of  hunting in Inuit life and re-affirms their right to self-determination.   
 
28 Robert Knox, Strategy and Tactics, 21 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 193 (2012).  
29 IN THE MATTER OF Section 53 of  the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26; AND IN THE MATTER OF a Reference by 
the Governor in Council concerning certain questions relating to the secession of  Quebec from Canada, as set out in Order in Council 
P.C. 1996-1497, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).  
30 Mohawk Nation Council of  Chiefs of  the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy, About the Mohawk Nation Council of  Chiefs.  
31 Dykes, supra note 23. 
32 Derek Inman et al., “We Will Remain Idle No More”: The Shortcomings of  Canada’s ‘Duty to Consult’ Indigenous People, 5 GOETTINGEN J. 
INT’L L. 251 (2013).  
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Moreover, given that most subsistence hunters in the Arctic are Inuit, Inuit now have a mix of  a monopoly 
over Arctic subsistence hunting (in fact) and sales to the EU (in law). They can claim that this mix enacts and 
strengthens their right to self-determination in international law. More specifically, Inuit leaders have more 
bargaining power to argue that they must have direct involvement in the design and implementation of  the new 
EU legislation. 
The AB had to determine the EU Seal Regime’s objective as part of  its Article XX-exception analysis. The 
disputants agreed that the main purpose of  the EU legislation was the protection of  seal welfare as a moral 
concern. The question arose as to the scope of  moral interests. Norway unsuccessfully argued that the EU 
legislation made exceptions for particular interests—indigenous, marine resource management, and travelers—
and that these were separate from the moral purpose. The AB treated the exceptions as part of  the moral 
concerns involved.33 In effect, the AB affirmed that any debate in the EU over seal welfare had to address 
indigenous interests. So, while EU legislation framed indigenous rights as a legal exception and animal rights 
activists argued that Inuit hunting practices were immoral, the AB ensured that indigenous peoples’ interests 
were considered as a principal legal and moral concern in all EU seal-hunting laws. 
Inuit communities have an opportunity to get out ahead and argue that the decision recognizes not only their 
rights and interests in seal hunting, but their rights to self-determination more broadly. There may be opportu-
nities not only at the WTO (or the European Court of  Justice34), but also in other jurisdictions and with regard 
to other markets to use the AB decision and assert their interests.   
Arctic Space and Multijurisdictional Sovereignty  
If  self-determination is articulated through hunting practices, sovereignty is articulated through hunting rules. 
Whoever makes the rules of  seal hunting is in effect exercising some sovereign power in the Arctic. Seal hunting 
might be seen as part of  a much broader jockeying for control and authority in the Arctic. 
The AB’s decision implicates a wider mesh of  overlapping sovereign power in the Arctic. Here’s a rough, 
incomplete political and institutional map of  Arctic sovereignty: 
The Government of  Nunavut is a semi-autonomous body governing a mostly Inuit community. Because 
Nunavut is a Canadian territory, it is created through federal law (unlike provinces which are created by the 
Canadian Constitution). This means it theoretically has a more direct relationship with the Federal government 
than the provinces. Broadly speaking, the Government of  Canada’s relationship with the diverse group of  
indigenous communities has been fraught. For example, recently, the UN Rapporteur on the Right to Food 
found that the Government of  Canada has neglected the socioeconomic well-being of  indigenous communities 
and has diminished indigenous control over land and natural resources.35  
Greenland is an autonomous country within the Kingdom of  Denmark. Unlike Denmark, Greenland is not 
a member of  the EU. Nor is it a party to the pan-European Schengen visa agreement. But to enter Greenland, 
citizens of  Nordic countries need only a valid identification card—suggesting that the Nordic Council36 is one 
forum for negotiating Arctic sovereignty. While Norway is not an EU member, it remains closely economically 
integrated through its membership in the European Economic Area. In North America, the Pacific NorthWest 
 
33 Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal products, supra note 1, at paras. 5.147, 5.161. 
34 Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625 (2013). 
35 UNHRC, Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/50/Add.1 (2012). 
36 Norden. 
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Economic Region is increasingly becoming an important forum for business and political leaders to align their 
Arctic interests.37 
The Inuit Circumpolar Council is a multinational nongovernmental organization representing Inuit/Yupik 
peoples living in Alaska38 (United States), Canada,39 Greenland,40 and Chukotka (Russia)41.  
The Arctic Council42 is the intergovernmental forum that addresses issues faced by the Arctic governments 
and indigenous peoples. It has eight member countries: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. Six Arctic indigenous communities 
have Permanent Participant status. A number of  countries have Permanent Observer status. The council’s orig-
inal purpose may have been to primarily focus on environmental protection and sustainable development issues, 
but it has become the principal forum for negotiating and constituting Arctic sovereignty.  
The EU’s ban on the seal hunt is one way through which it exercises sovereign power in the Arctic. The EU, 
however, has bigger plans than just regulating seal hunts. It has been trying to become a Permanent Observer 
of  the Arctic Council as a means to increase its role in polar geopolitics. Until now, its permanent status has 
been vetoed by Canada as an explicit response to the seal hunt dispute.43 Some argue that the Canada-EU Joint 
Statement changes Canada’s position in the Arctic Council and may open avenues for EU permanent status.44 
But demonstrating the complexity of  both the seal trade and polar politics, Greenland is threatening to veto 
the EU’s Arctic Council membership now that its seal products’ privileged access to the EU market is threat-
ened after the AB decision.45  
Shifting Interests 
The biggest losers46 in this case are the nonindigenous communities that depend on seal hunting in Atlantic 
Canada—the so-called commercial hunters.47 They were done in by both the WTO and EU. This is tragic since 
these communities have been on a sharp socioeconomic decline since the fisheries collapse in the 1990s. Up 
until now, the Government of  Canada was primarily representing their interests in the WTO dispute. However, 
it looks like an EU Seal Regime with an IC exception is here to stay in some form. So, only the Government 
of  Canada and respective provincial governments will be able to provide these communities any immediate 
relief. 
That also means that the Government of  Canada is likely to shift its energies and put more emphasis on 
representing Inuit seal hunting interests in international trade and other international forums—mostly to en-
hance its Arctic sovereignty claims. Since the Government of  Nunavut is a key player in how the Government 
of  Canada exercises Arctic sovereignty, this AB decision grants the Government of  Nunavut and Inuit leaders 
more leverage when negotiating with the Government of  Canada regarding support and resources for Inuit 
 
37 The Pacific NorthWest Economic Region Arctic Caucus. 
38 Inuit Circumpolar Council-Alaska. 
39 Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada. 
40 Inuit Circumpolar Council Greenland. 
41 Inuit Circumpolar Council Russia. 
42 Arctic Council. 
43 Canada against EU entry to Arctic Council because of  seal trade ban, CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION NEWS (Apr. 29, 2009).  
44 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Implementation moves ahead on WTO seal ban dispute (Sep. 15, 2014).  
45 Kevin McGwin, EU seal ban: A seal of  disapproval, THE ARCTIC JOURNAL (Feb. 18, 2015). 
46 Tom Ayers Cape Breton Bureau, Seal hunt off  Nova Scotia dormant as pelt market disappears, HERALD NEWS (Mar. 31, 2015). 
47 Nina Lex, EU seal ban seen as threat to Newfoundland villages, REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2009). 
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peoples.48 And so, this may be an opportunity for Inuit communities to get more from the Government of  
Canada in the short term and enhance their position under international law in the long term. 
 
48 Terry Audla, Terry Audla on Idle No More: The view from the (far, far) North, NATIONAL POST (Jan. 29, 2013). 
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